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Daniel Dennett's Intentional Stance

George Fletcher
Faculty Sponsor: Dr. Hans Herbert Koegler
Associate Professor of Philosophy
Introduction

In his work over the last thirty years,
the philosopher Daniel Dennett has
articulated a philosophical attitude, the
intentional stance, in hopes of providing a
firm foundation for research efforts in the
interdisciplinary field of inquiry known as
cognitive science. Falling under the
umbrella of cognitive science are those
areas of computer science, linguistics,
philosophy, anthropology, psychology, and
neuroscience that, naively put, assume, in
various shapes and forms, that the human
brain is a computer and that the subjective
"mind" is a function of this physical
machine. Various computational models of
consciousness based on this assumption
have been put forward in the past quarter
century - and, troubling enough, none
have yet to produce any program or
machine with results remotely resembling
human consciousness.
A major stumbling block in the
formative years of cognitive science was
recognizing and defining the key element
necessary for producing an artificially
intelligent machine - namely,
consciousness. What is consciousness?
What are the defining features, after all, of
this sentience that accompanies "cognitive
processing" (e.g., the mental addition of
numbers, pattern recognition, etc.)? These
considerations become especially
problematic when one asks - "How do I
know that your experiences are (generally)
the same as mine?" Pushing this question
even further, one is then forced to ask how
criteria established from the perspective of
the first-person can be generalized in a way
that can be utilized by an objective science
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of consciousness. Thus, researchers in
cognitive science soon found themselves
turning to philosophers, who have been
debating these deeper questions for some
time now, for answers to the tough
questions of the being of consciousness in hopes that they would be provided
with a workable model and method to
use for overcoming the enigmatic nature
of consciousness.
The intentional stance proposed by
Dennett is necessary to clear the way for
one such coupling of model and method.
By this stance, Dennett suggests that in
ordinary everyday life we treat others (the
subject in our experiments and research) as
intentional systems; "that is, as entities
whose behavior can be predicted by the
method of attributing beliefs, desires, and
rational acumen" under the assumption that
the other is rational like one's self (Stance
49). This stance is proposed as an
alternative to the traditional, Cartesian,
dualistic conception of mind and body that
permeates common assumptions about the
nature of self-consciousness, the soul, and
the body. "Heterophenomenology" is a
method, based upon this behavioristic
stance, that Dennett contends transcends
the limitations of common-sense
assumptions to support a computational
model of consciousness.
Heterophenomenology downplays
the reality of the internal experiential
aspects of consciousness in deference
to an intentional, language-based model
of consciousness that places emphasis
on the neutral acceptance of the speech
reports of subjects as the basis for
understanding consciousness - thus
placing the foundations of consciousness
in a physical, monistic (physical sans
soul), computational device (the brain).
I shall argue that this methodology can be
seen as a form of empathic extrapolation
of self-understanding onto the other in
dialogue, akin to the work of early
hermeneutics. 11 This methodology is
closely tied in with a contemporary
connectionist conception of computability

that Dennett develops in his book
Consciousness Explained.
This essay has three major parts:
heterophenomenology, hermeneutics, and
implications of hermeneutics for
heterophenomenology - the first twothirds being, for the purposes of contrast
and comparison, mainly exegetical. I will
initially be concerned with developing
more fully not only an account of Dennett's
heterophenomenology but also the
background that gave rise to it. I will also
explore in this part the relationship between
Dennett's notion of phenomenology and
intentionality and the account of
intentionality developed by Edmund
Husserl in his Logical Investigations . This
will be necessary to draw the external
critique of heterophenomenology as method
developed in the second part of this essay
and Dennett's model closer together for the
sake of highlighting their common ancestry.
I will next bring into question the notion of
method in the human sciences by
examining a strain of philosophical thought,
which, at first glance, seems completely
foreign to the concerns of cognitive
science. Hermeneutics is the philological /
philosophical tradition concerned with the
proper interpretation and understanding of
the voice of the other in dialogue and texts.
Hans-Georg Gadamer's hermeneutics, as
developed in his work Truth and Method,
serves as a vehicle to bring into question
the methods and goals of science and the
subject / object dichotomy upon which they
are based. Working through Gadamer's
relationship, via Martin Heidegger, to
Husserl's phenomenology, I will bring to
light, contra understanding as instrumental
empathic transposition in
heterophenomenology, a competing view of
dialogue founded in the sustained, mutual
agreement of interlocutors. The
hermeneutic vision of language as mutual
agreement developed in this section of the
project will be informed and directed by the
contemporary critical-hermeneutic work of
Hans-Herbert Kogler.

I will close with a consideration of the
implications of hermeneutics for
heterophenomenology and similar research
efforts in cognitive science. Although it is
my main goal to articulate a view of
cognitive science and artificial intelligence
from a hermeneutically sensitive position, I
will attempt to develop some of the
ramifications of careless objectification in
the human sciences. When we objectify our
fellow humans in research under the object
/ subject dichotomy, we place significant
dialogue in a precarious position. By
treating the other in dialogue as an object,
available for manipUlation and domination
(via the scientific method), we run the risk
of alienation and termination of any fruitful
dialogue that may lead to a deeper
understanding of the nature of being
and consciousness, and of the relationship
of the self to language and other agents.
In conclusion, I will consider the bearing
of this impasse for future studies in
cognitive science.

Husserl and Dennett:
Heterophenomenology as Method
Husserl's Proposal
We begin our study by developing a
conception of intentionality vis-a-vis the
transcendental phenomenology of Edmund
Husserl. In an attempt to avoid what he
considers the naiVete of objectivism in
psychologism and the "positivistic"
sciences, Husserl grounds knowledge (in
the tradition of Kant but against the
shortcomings of the "forms of knowledge"
of the neo-Kantians) in a transcendental
subjectivity not unlike Descartes' cogito;
i.e., the cogito posited to serve as the basis
for an eradication of deception in the
material world. Because of the rich
structure of transcendental subjectivity
developed in Husserl's writings, it is easy
to lose oneself in exegesis. Nevertheless, it
will be instructive for us to understand
more fully Husserl's motivation for this
attempt, both as a contrast to Dennett's
Osprey Journal of Ideas and Inquiry 101

understanding of intentionality and as the
framework in which Heidegger and
Gadamer after him worked and struggled.
When we come to grasp the full import of
this project, however, we will see that
Husserl's equation of meaning with the
noetic bed of phenomenological being leads
inevitably to a solipsistic idealism that
makes a return to the world (the life-world
of sensile hyle which was supposed to
support an ego-centric investigation of
intentionality) impossible (in contrast to the
Cartesian cogito) (Ideas §85, 227-230). To
this end, I will, after a brief outline of
Husserl's project, take a look at two
peculiar aspects, or rather symptomatic
results, of phenomenological reduction
(epoche) which lead to the untenable nature
of a "scientific" study of intentionality namely, the alienation of self from
community and the desire to found
knowledge as constitutive of this loss.
The "crisis" of the western mind that
Husserl speaks of in his Vienna Lecture is,
in a sense, real. The trend towards
objectification (that is, the striving towards
an explicating methodology in the human
sciences that has marked the progress of
our intellect since the "Enlightenment") has
necessarily neglected both the qualitative
(ineffable) aspects of subjectivity that are
the hallmarks of consciousness (in the
natural sciences and philosophy of
language post-Frege) and the life-world
background that orients us towards just
these notions of objectivity and subjectivity
(in the dialogue stemming from
transcendental phenomenology). I say
"necessarily" because science deals only
with intersubjective experience experience that relies upon language and
the conceptualizing power of speech communication with other humans in an
attempt to deal with each other and
interactions with a natural world. Science
can be criticized for trivializing or denying
the existence of the individualistic and
historically situated aspects of experience
in striving for objectivity.
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Coupled with a Western teleology of
reason, exemplified in Hegel's
understanding of absolute being, this
objectifying spirit leads in various paths to
foundationally oriented structures of
experience and understanding that appear
on further analysis to merely buttress the
deep seated beliefs of our culture against
views on the periphery of our objective
gaze. 12 The answer, Husserl maintains,
is to tum altogether from this naturalization
of spirit that science advocates to a new,
purified science of intentional analysis for "no objective science can do justice
to the [very] subjectivity which
accomplishes science" (10).
To found knowledge, in hopes of
establishing a "science of consciousness",
Husserl must find a bedrock upon which
his science may be stabilized. His initial
step is to differentiate between a "natural
standpoint" and a more fundamental state
of "Being" (Ideas §32). The natural
standpoint is the practical one within which
we operate on a daily basis as we attend to
the affairs of non-philosophizing be-ing (to
foreshadow our Heideggarian exploration
of hermeneutics). It is the natural thesis that
we presuppose for every act we commit in
the community - the stance we take
towards the world we find about us (§28).
He proposes that we bracket the natural
standpoint of spatio-temporal existence
(setting aside the facticity of Dasein) a suspension of belief rather than
hyperbolic doubt - to get to the basis of
the being of consciousness:
Consciousness in itself has a being of its
own which in its absolute uniqueness of
nature remains unaffected by the
phenomenological disconnexion. It therefore
remains over as a "phenomenological
residuum," as a region of Being which is in
principle unique, and can become in fact the
field of a new science - the science of
phenomenology. (§33)

By returning our attention to the
"essence" of consciousness, this epoche of
the natural thesis will hopefully allow us to
avoid the trivialization of spirit that occurs
when we place all our focus on the natural
world (§34).
When we deal with "pure" phenomena
as presented to the self when we turn our
gaze inwards, we no longer presuppose or
concern ourselves with or even have
recourse to the objective-external referents
of intentionality - we loose certainty, in
the end, of the things in themselves which
our thoughts necessarily depend upon to be
intentional (be conscious of) - the
fundamental relationship between the
cogito and its cogitatum. I3 With this loss,
however, we open the possibility of
studying the pure meaning-bestowing
relationship that holds between pure ego
and its sphere of pure experience
(Erlebnisse) (Ideas §33). The "being" of
consciousness has as its essence the
intentional relationship, and this essence
becomes the focus of phenomenology.14
Immediately one asks - "what become of
the 'others' out-there that form the
community we are part of, those other
subjects that exist in the social world we
bracketed in the phenomenological
epoche?" They cannot escape the reduction;
they cannot serve in our search for a
"science of consciousness". This paints a
lonely, desolate, and truly antiseptic picture
of the individual ego searching for
foundations, floating out beyond the
community. Are the others, in a sense,
encompassed by the master-self as acts of
idealistic instantiation? Husserl seems to
notice this problem early on, yet does not
recognize the significance of this solipsism:
Despite all this [the possible
contradiction of "others"], we come to
understandings with our neighbors, and set
up in common an objective spatio-temporal
fact-world as the world about us that is
there for us all, and to which we ourselves
nonetheless belong. (§29)

This is quite a leap of faith to take.
How do we "set up in common" the natural
world? By Husserl's own admission, the
strictness of "science" allows for empathy
and acknowledgment of an other as merely
representative activities of the ego (Ideas
§42). Yet, the bogey of solipsism, he
maintains, is merely an illusion - a
transcendental illusion that can be dispelled
with a pinch of faith (Formal and
Transcendental Logic §96.b). Again in
Phenomenology:
The reductive method is transferred
from self-experience to the experience of
others insofar as there can be applied to the
envisaged mental life of the Other the
corresponding bracketing and description
according to the subjective 'How' of its
appearance and what is appearing ... thus
results the perfect expansion of the genuine
psychological concept of 'inner experience'
... the reduced intersubjectivity, in pure
form and concretely grasped, is a
community of pure 'persons' acting in the
intersubjective realm of the pure life of
consciousness ... (18-19)
This, too, seems questionable. How
can we apply/expand 'inner experience' to
the Other without presupposing the
supremacy of Self? To understand otherness
in the study of the transcendental ego as
absolute subjectivity, the Other in dialogue
becomes first and foremost alien - a nonego that only through painful admission
becomes an alter-ego. 15 When the smoke
clears, we see that:
As this absolute ego, considering
myself henceforth as my exclusive thematic
field, I carry on all my further senseinvestigations ... I reflect upon what I can
find purely "in" myself ... I separate that
which is primordially my own and that
which is constituted in me at different
levels as something "alien": that which is
constituted, in me, as real or ideal;
constituted, in me, as Nature, as
psychophysical being, as a human
community, as a people or as a state, as
Osprey Journal of Ideas and Inquiry 103

reified culture, as science, ... by the effort
of my own thinking. (Formal and
Transcendental Logic § 104)
Can the Other become a personal
fiction? Surely not - how do we speak of
otherness in the first place? Yet, on this
account it surely seems so. Or is this
troublesome route to community merely the
by-product of a failed attempt to found
knowledge in the Self?
This suggests the second peculiarity I
would like to touch upon before we move
on to Dennett's heterophenomenologynamely, Husserl's lack of rigorous selfcriticism of the presupposition of the
cogitator / cogitatum distinction necessary
to undertake the phenomenological epoche
which, in the final analysis, points to the
constructive nature of pure ego. He does
not consider critically approaching his own
understanding of "self' as a socially
organized and acquired conception (which
can fundamentally motivate his very
inquiry ).16 In light of the intentional
relationship between pure ego and its
representational constructions that makes
the epoche possible, a void opens between
the "self' and other - a void that seems to
be incommensurable. How can he be
certain of the concreteness, so to speak, of
the "self as subject" as the firm basis for
the intersubjective transcendence of
consciousness? Cannot our conception of
an autonomous "self' be a socially,
culturally, and historically situated, given,
and directed one? At this point, we can
criticize Husserl for taking this conception
("self' as an a priori - "necessary" truth)
for granted without considering the
relationship of subject to community.
Later, we shall see worked out in
Gadamer's hermeneutics not only a
response to just these questions but also a
consideration of the bearing of
hermeneutics on any methodological
explication of being and consciousness.
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Dennett's Proposal
As we move our discussion to the
contemporary reflections of Daniel Dennett
found in his books The Intentional Stance
and Consciousness Explained, we must
reorient ourselves to accommodate a new
set of concepts and new understanding of
the problems of consciousness. Although it
will initially help to view his instrumental
view of phenomenological research within
the Husserlian framework originating in
modem Cartesian philosophy, we must
eventually overcome a century's difference
in development and reconfiguration that
informs Dennett. In this section I will
recapitulate the time-lapse between these
two thinkers while developing an
understanding of Dennett's methodological
stance and goal. In the conclusion of this
essay, I will move to develop a critical
reevaluation of Dennett's thought through a
hermeneutic conception of understanding
and dialogue in the human sciences by
carving out a space for understanding as a
mutual discovery between agents of
significance in a space of historical-cultural
background oriented self-discovery.
Following Gottlob Frege, AngloAmerican philosophy concerned itself
mainly not with questions of intentionality
and phenomenological structures, but rather
with those of the supposed logical,
propositional and sentential structure of
belief and understanding. This focus on the
logic of language over the situatedness of
communication, typified by the early work
of Wittgenstein, quickly settled into an uninsightful dead end that eventually led to
Wittgenstein's rejection of the mathematical
conceptualization of belief and
intentionality. This rejection was initiated
by Wittgenstein's insight that meaning is
not necessarily oriented always towards
truth (propositional truth-sentences) truth being a key component of any
positivistic inquiry. Carried through by
Donald Davidson's work (stemming from
Willard Quine) on translation (viz.,
translation as correlation of truth-sentences)

under a principle of charity, a general
sensitivity developed to a conception of
speaking as a purely social activity in fonnsof-life as well as to the interdependency of
conceptual schemes, under which
interpretation is always perfonned, and its
target content-matter. Dennett takes as his
point of departure Wittgenstein's
Philosophical Investigations and this general
insight into a practical, instrumental, and
holistic view of language and belief
fonnation / actualization (CE 463).
Dennett likens the bulk of
contemporary analytic philosophy of
language to the planetary epicycles studied
by pre-Copernicans astronomers. We are
caught up in the quandaries of "qualia" and
the "intrinsic qualities of inner-life", not
because of an essential structure of
consciousness that dictates ontological
distinctions, but rather because of our use
of the traditional metaphors inherited from
epistemological, metaphysical, and
ontological (eidos oriented) investigations
that infonn the way we speak of
consciousness (CE 455). On this account,
the debates between idealism and dualism
are moot; Dennett feels that the ways in
which the metaphors of mind / brain and
soul/body infonn our talk of "reality"
effectively halt any progress towards a
theory of consciousness.17 Instead, we
should highlight the pragmatic nature of
dialogue in fonns-of-life.
Liberated from the constraints of the
traditional dialogue, Dennett sets himself
the task of developing a productive method
of intentional research that coincides more
closely with the aims of natural science.
Dennett, desiring to uncover the possibility
of developing a computer model of
consciousness, is concerned with how we
can systematically study "subjective",
intentional experience - and the basic
message of several hundred pages of
analysis amounts to a simple, pragmatic
justification of naturalized consciousness.
We begin, on this account, from an
intentional stance grounded in common
sense folk psychology, whereby we treat

the other as rational (from our own notions
of sense and rationality) and hence highly
predictable, just as we nonnally do in our
daily non-philosophical activities in the
life-world. In this fonnulation, we have a
theory of mental content that sets aside
ontological considerations by working
under a natural ontological attitude; i.e.,
that of the "disinterested" natural scientist;
i.e., acceptance of the materialistic
mainstream Western conception of Being.
Setting aside concerns about physical
design or implementation, we use this
stance to fonn a theory of competence that is, a theory of what it takes to be an
intentional system conceived of in holistic,
instrumentalistic, and nonnative tenns "a sort of holistic logical behaviorism" as
Dennett calls it (Stance 57-58).
Interpreting the beliefs and belief talk
of an other is taken to be merely an
instrumental self-projection of self on to the
subject - where the other's beliefs are
taken, with a grain of salt, to be "real" and
"true" for purely useful, predictive goals
(72-73). However, Dennett still stresses the
fact that, under this stance, we do not
commit ourselves to any metaphysical
claims and that such "neutral" and arbitrary
ascription of reality and truth-values is to
be taken as a strategic maxim rather than as
a binding epistemological principle (75).
It is important for this discussion, and
particularly for understanding Dennett, to
mention the profound effect evolutionary
explanations of general phenomena have on
contemporary discourse. Dennett, as many
intellectuals are, is enamored with the
predicative and productive capacities of the
mathematical-naturalistic sciences. The use
of Darwin's ideas to "reveal" the "true"
nature of all social and natural events is
currently in vogue. Dennett, feeling that the
inherent practicality of these ideas is in
tune with his instrumental view of dialogue,
is eager in his development of a theory of
consciousness to abide by the dictates of
evolutionary explanation.
On the path to a productive theory of
consciousness, Dennett's primary task is to
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develop a new methodology for research
founded on this intentional stance. With a
Wittgenstein-Davidsonian pragmatic
understanding of interpretation (reinforced
with Darwinian tools), he has a fmn footing
to uncover just what such a method entails.
What is a believer in this stance?
[A]ny object - or as I shall say, any
system - whose behavior is well predicted
by this strategy [the Intentional Strategy] is
in the fullest sense of the word a believer.
What it is to be a true believer is to be an
intentional system, a system whose
behavior is reliably and voluminously
predictable via the intentional strategy [an
interest relative cross of realism and
interpretation ism]." (Stance 15, 27)
In the Heterophenomenological
method, we approach the verbal, behavioral
report of a subject on her experiences much
like an anthropologist would the reports of
members of another social group in
investigating their religion. Individuals,
under this method, are the authors of their
"fictional worlds" (notional worlds,
alternatively) of experience, and it is the
role of the investigator to maintain "a
constructive and sympathetic neutrality, in
hopes of compiling a definitive description
of the world according to the subjects" as
they record the 'texts' of the authors (CE
83). These neutrally compiled texts (as
"theorists '" fictions) allow the investigator
to interpret the phenomenological world of
an individual, as reported, as one would
interpret a novel to be read. "Maximally
extended, it is a neutral portrayal of exactly
what it is like to be that subject - in the
subject's own terms, given the best
interpretation we can muster" (98). In this
light, the concept of selfhood and soul are
"abstractions rather than nuggets of
mysterious stuff ... they're exquisitely
useful fictions" (367).
The heterophenomenologist can now
turn to the task of developing a naturalistic
causal account of how these fictions are
created. Dennett elaborates a detailed
106 Osprey Journal of Ideas and Inquiry

computational mechanism, using the latest
ideas of parallel distributed processing,
neural networks, and memes, to "explain"
consciousness in his interesting work
Consciousness Explained. The details,
although quite interesting and well
developed, are of little significance for our
present essay.
Auto- vs. Hetero- phenomenology
At this point I will undertake a more
direct comparison of Husserl and Dennett.
Through this, we shall clarify the
similarities of each and gain an overall
better understanding of their projects. It
will be helpful here to adopt Dennett's
terminology whereby he distances himself
from traditional phenomenology; an egocentric investigator in the Husserlian
tradition I shall label autophenomenologist;
the pragmatic scientist I shall term the
heterophenomenologist. 18 To streamline this
process further, I will work under four
headings that will hopefully delineate their
essential differences: goals, views on
intentionality, methodology, and attitudes
towards realism and the life-world.
Goals. The main contrast between the
auto and hetero phenomenologists lies in the
overall aims of each project. For the auto,
a science of consciousness is sought which
in the end will support a grand foundation
for all knowledge. This traditional
philosophical ideal is immediately evident
from the start in Husserl's transcendental
phenomenology. We aim, in this schema, to
replace previous foundations at hand with
an ultimate bedrock:
In opposition to all previously designed
objective sciences, which are sciences on
the ground of the world, this would be a
science of the universal how of the
pregivenness of the world, i.e., of what
makes it a universal ground for any sort of
objectivity. (Crisis §38)
Unlike those before him, Husserl boldly
attempted to overhaul our understanding of

self and the world. Like those before him,
however, he boldly asserted the supremacy
of his own culturally acquired
presuppositions and failed to break with the
"enlightenment" he criticized and the
circularity of the dichotomies cherished by
its method.
The hetero, on the other hand, tempers
any yearnings for universality with an
appeal to pragmatic holism. She seeks an
"objective" science of consciousness
supported by her productive method.
Intentionality. In pure phenomenology,
the auto investigates the essence of the
intentional correlation; the
phenomenological field of experience is
between an ego-pole and a world-pole and
therein lies the intentional correlation that
gives rise to meaning in experience:
Essential intentionality

J,
I-pole

<=:::> World-pole

Thus posited, the auto circumscribes
any infmite regress by placing the self in
relationship to the lifeworld, while at the
same time also negates the significance of
others in giving supremacy to the
conscious-ego as meaning giver-endower. 19
The hetero views this system-building
as ludicrous. Intentionality is a place-holder
borrowed from folk psychology (which is
unfortunately reified/deified by
autophenomenology) that can be used as
a tool for predicting and controlling the
other - specifically:
We must treat the noise-emitter as an
agent, indeed a rational agent, who harbors
beliefs and desires and other mental states
that exhibit intentionality or 'aboutness,'
and whose actions can be explained (or
predicted) on the basis of the content of
these states. (CE 76-77).
As intentional systems, bestowed with
a self-similar (to the hetero's) experience of

"reality" through acts of self-projection, the
hetero holds a limited sense of "rationality"
for her research subjects. 2o
Method. The epoche, as the auto's
main method, is taken to be a self-evidently
effective tool that allows investigation into
the world-constructing essence of being:
Every opinion about 'the' world has its
ground in the pregiven world. It is from this
very ground that I have freed myself
through the epoche; I stand above the world,
which has now become for me, in a quite
peculiar sense, a phenomenon. (Crisis §41)
Responding to Heidegger's Being and
Time, the auto recognizes the background
that orients her epoche (the main
methodological tool), yet still maintains its
efficacy.21
For the hetero, her method is just that
of modem science coupled with a
predictive strategy. The determination of
the efficacy of this approach is left to the
normal means of the scientific community.22
Attitude towards realism and the
lifeworld. What kind of realism about the
lifeworld do each of these projects entail?
The world,for the auto, is a fundamental
realm of life before objective science in the
form of a structured horizon. "The world is
pregiven to us, the waking, always
somehow practically interested subjects,
not occasionally but always and necessarily
as the universal field of all actual and
possible praxis, as horizon." (Crisis §37)
The hetero, on the other hand, views
the world as "the objective, materialistic,
third-person world of the physical sciences"
(Stance 5). This view is coupled with the
pragmatic / productive holistic intentional
strategy in an ironic use of the
Wittgensteinian insight into forms of life to
overthrow significant dialogue. It must
always be remembered that "deviation from
normal interpersonal relations is the price
that must be paid for the neutrality a science
of consciousness demands." (CE 83)
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Gadamer's Hermeneutic Critique of
Interpretive Method
When we follow the trajectory of
thought from HusserI to Gadamer, we find
a common theme and purpose. Each turns
from the objectifying tendencies of
modernity in search of a more satisfying
account of Being - each building upon the
former while responding to the postNietzschean episteme (incredulity towards
tradition) that marked the thought of the
20th century and continues to influence
philosophical dialogue. In this section, I
develop an account of Gadamer's thought
in relation to this arch of discourse and see
if we can be justified in finding satisfaction
in his onto-linguistic hermeneutics. To that
end, it will be necessary to gain some
understanding of Heidegger's use of the
phenomenological method in explicating
Being, as Dasein, and language - not to
develop a criticism, but to better understand
what Gadamer is hoping to achieve. After'
outlining his thought, I will briefly entertain
some criticisms of the linguistic idealism
that Gadamer's hermeneutics suggests and
explore whether or not Gadamer attends
to the influence that society has on
discourse - as has been highlighted by
critical theory. I will then tie together these
thoughts to show that the tum from
modernity to language is not, at core, antianything in orienting towards Heideggarean
phenomenology. On the contrary, the
suspension of awe before the positive
methodology of the scientific program
is urged by the need not to destroy or
to leave it by the wayside but rather by
the need to develop a wider, more
pluralistic (vs. dichotomous) account
of humanistic understanding.
It is reasonable to see Heidegger's
working-out of Dasein, in part, as an
attempt to recover the most useful parts of
HusserI's phenomenology. HusserI, in
grounding knowledge in a transcendental
subjectivity via the phenomenological
epoche, hoped to avoid what he saw as
naIve objectification in Enlightenment
108 Osprey Journal of Ideas and Inquiry

thought. This move towards a
transcendental subject, however, does not
lead to a satisfactory understanding of
Being; in fact, as we have already seen, the
positing of the solipsisticly situated self in
HusserI's reduction ultimately opens an
unbridgeable void between the subject and
the bracketed community of Others out in
the life-worId. 23 That he noticed the
shortcomings of the methods of modernity
and attempted to reconcile them with the
"ineffable" aspects of consciousness is of
great importance. Unfortunately, his desire
to ground knowledge in an ultimate
foundation (and to develop an a priori
science of phenomenology) led to other
problems that make questionable the
extent to which we can be satisfied
with his conclusions.
Heidegger points out that this
solipsistic move is a result of anxiety that is, the natural stand-point is but one of
the possibilities that is open to the self being-in-the-worId as 'fallen' - focusing
on the stand-point (constituted by the drive
in objectification), and thus causing the
inauthenticity which gives rise, ultimately,
to individuating anxiety (BT §40).
Heidegger took the results of HusserI's
phenomenological investigations and shed
light not only on the limiting (inauthentic)
nature of the reductive method (a
narrowing of focus) but also on its
contextual (and historical) aspects. 24
In Being and Time, Heidegger brings out
the "fore-knowledge" - the backdrop, so
to speak - the historical nature of
essentialism, of which HusserI's
phenomenology serves as crown, in some
regards - in his criticism of Enlightenment
inquiry. Interpretation, in this account,
comes into playas explication rather than
self-projection; i.e., "meaning" only makes
sense in specific contexts and against a
holistic background of shared, pervasive
practices. The possibilities open to Being
for understanding in the worId are more
wide-open than that allowed within the
consciousness of modernity (the
consciousness of rational, eidetic

dichotomies). It is in a temporal act, rather,
that meaning becomes possible:
In interpreting, we do not ... throw a
'signification' over some naked thing which
is present-at-hand ... when something
within-the-world is encountered as such,
the thing in question already has an
involvement which is disclosed in our
understanding of the world ... (§32)

Before any conceptualization, before
any knowledge, there is a "fore-ground", a
"fore-structure", a "fore-knowledge" that
makes the act possible. Husserl's selfcriticism failed in this regard. We become
aware, after Heidegger, that the
transcendental subject is not possible
without the bracketed life-world.25
Through his critique, Heidegger brings
out the two very important points from
which Gadamer departs: 1) the forestructuring of experience - Dasein as the
"historical being" and 2) the possibilities of
being in time (over and against anxiety)both of which together have made
Enlightenment thought (or any, for that
matter) possible. We cannot, however,
break out of the 'circle' of our
understanding to attain the God's eye view
of the metaphysician - the "independent
standpoint of the observer". In fact, it is
within the circle that meaning lies:
What is decisive is not to get out of the
circle but to come into it in the right way
.. .in the circle is hidden the positive
possibility of the most primordial kind of
knowing ... our first, last, and constant task
is never to allow our fore-having, foresight, and fore-conception to be presented
to us by fancies and popular conceptions,
but rather to make the scientific theme
secure by working out these fore-structures
in terms of the things themselves. (§32)
The difficulty in "securing" this,
however, lies in trying to develop an
account that does not make any universal,
trans-historical claims. This, in a sense, is

what all of the thinkers after Husserl have
been dealing with - trying to balance, on
one hand, the problematic nature of
foundationalism that highlights the need for
a reassessment of positive methodology and
metaphysical inquiry with, on the other, the
contradictions we run into when, in the
light of this reassessment, we try to support
in some way any claims we may make,
without resorting to essentialism.
Gadamer, while hoping to avoid
Heidegger's claims of goal-driven
methodology, emphasizes the historicallinguistic ground of Dasein in his working
of hermeneutic consciousness. Whereas
Heidegger saw language as but one of the
possibilities of Being, Gadamer places
Being and understanding fully in language
- thus bringing together Heidegger's two
themes (the fore-structure and open
possibilities of being) in the space of
discursive activity. Language, in this
account, is the fundamental mode of
operation of our being-in-the-world and the
all-embracing form of the constitution of
the world (Reader, 111) and the goal of
hermeneutics thus becomes to reconnect the
objective world of technology, which the
sciences place at our disposal and
discretion, with those fundamental orders of
being that are neither arbitrary nor
manipulated by us, but rather simply
demand our respect. (111)
The world, for conscious being, is an
endless linguistic creation, the instantiating
source of which lies in our shared traditions
and 'prejudices'. 26 It is in this tum to
language that he hopes to find safety from
any methodological (ahistorical) claims.
So, just what is contemporary hermeneutics
(as opposed to traditional)?27 As Gadamer
works it out in his essay "Hermeneutics as
practical philosophy", it is, at base, an art
of understanding that moves beyond
methodology - and so we have to come to
see hermeneutics as a "dimension of human
ability ... [having] to do with what is each
individual's due as a citizen ... " that
inevitably comes out of practice (327).
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Acknowledging the historical
consciousness (wirkungsgeschichtliches
bewusstsein) as the base of the linguistic
"space" of discourse, so to speak,
Henneneutics can designate a natural
capacity of human beings ... it refers to the
human capacity for intelligent interchange
with one's fellows. (328)
This interchange builds upon
Heidegger's notions of the situated,
temporal consciousness - in a way,
fleshing out his ideas with the body of
language. The relation between the self and
other that was severed in Husserl's
transcendental subject - the relationship
between self and a discursive text - is
now reconnected in an understanding of
their inextricable co-dependence - downplaying the autonomy of the Western self
(the "I", the Dasein).
The purpose of developing some of our
ideas about the universality of this
linguistic space is, as Gadamer states in the
forward to the second edition of Truth and
Method, not to prescribe "what we do or
what we ought to do" but rather to bring to
light "what happens to us over and above
our wanting and doing" (339). Through
henneneutic inquiry, Heidegger's 'circle' of
understanding is never ending - nonteleological spirit that is worked out further
through discourse when the depth of being
is brought to light, escaping reduction to an
object of knowledge. This escape from the
"leveling" of modernity, Gadamer feels, is
the "universal human task" Genuine speaking, which has something to
say and hence does not give prearranged
signals, but rather seeks words through
which one reaches the other person ...
(Reader, 121)
When we leave behind the inherited,
written tradition (Weitersagen) - we make
a move to disarm anxiety (significance of
life, etc.).
We can question Gadamer about his
commitments in this seemingly linguistic
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idealism, however. To vouchsafe
knowledge in universal discourse seems, in
a sense, to be a step backwards. Gadamer
would respond to this, not with a counter
argument, but rather an appeal to our
understanding of language. The move to
solipsism is not possible, he would contend,
in light of the fact that "there is absolutely
no captivity within a language" discourse is the on-going creative act that
makes experience possible (Reader, 120).
This assertion does carry its own weight in
Gadamer's conception of Being"Language goes beyond the consciousness
of the speaker and is in this respect more
than a subjective behavior" (Foreword,
348). To cry idealism is to misunderstand
the goal of henneneutics - the
broadening-of-horizons.
On the other hand, we can criticize
Gadamer for not attending to the insights
of the critical theorists and Foucault's
analysis of the role of power in discourse.
It seems that he is a bit of an optimist, in
that he supposes (necessarily) that all
individuals will pick up the torch of
humanism (and human solidarity). The
only consolation (to counter this criticism)
would be to consider the play of power to
be an element of the discursive creation of
being that is at a level less abstract than the
articulation of henneneutics itself, deferred
to latter discussion; although critical theory
is a tonic in many ways, we must still
return to the question of why just such an
orientation towards power structures in the
body of language is refreshing to our
sensibilities. A Gadamerian conception of
prejudice may possibly overcome
Enlightenment ideals that still lie donnant
in our post-Marxean episteme.
Gadamer's henneneutics is responding to
the shortcomings of Husserl and the
suggestions of Heidegger in an attempt to
liberate Being from categorization and
'mechanization' (to use Gadamer's word).
In the spirit of Derrida's differance,
Gadamer suggests that liberating "play goes
beyond the consciousness of the player and
is in this respect more than subjective

behavior" (Foreword, 348).28 Gadamer is
attempting to open a space for ethical selfcreation after-modernity; i.e., he is
attempting to prevent conversation from
degenerating into inquiry, into a research
program, not to eliminate the role of
scientific inquiry.29 Science is not ultimately
discarded, but rather 'put in its place' as a
non-final arbiter of 'reality'. Gadamer has
not given us a thorough system of inquiry
or universal-schematic metaphysical
account. Rather, through the eye-opening
hermeneutic move, he has given us ideas to
help broaden the closed horizon of the
world of Enlightenment thought in which
we labor and to open our ears to the
unclosed, non-teleological, "infinite
dialogue [that] is opened in the direction of
the truth that we are" (Reader, 120).
Conclusion
For some readers sensitive to holism,
the hermeneutic ideas developed in this
essay will strike either a positive or
negative chord. This gut-reaction lies at the
heart of an important split in philosophical
discourse surrounding holistic conceptions
of language. While Dennett relies on some
holistic view of understanding and dialogue
as support for the intentional stance,
hermeneutics also relies on a practical
holistic conception of interpretation and
understanding. As we have seen, however,
each view has a different orientation
towards its interlocutor, the other in
communication. The heterophenomenologist builds theories, the hermeneutist
seeks significance and self-unfolding.
Theory-building and methodological
inquiry are not, as such, futile endeavors,
however; I do not make this claim. On the
contrary, the linguistic ability to support
alternate modes of explanation is central to
the nature of our being. In the Fregean
tradition, we still engage in dialogue.
However, the positivistic intent and
orientation that support its "success" in tum
lead to "deviation from normal
interpersonal relations," as Dennett

willingly concedes.
In the essay "Holism and Hermeneutics,"
Hubert Dreyfus elucidates a distinction
between practical and theoretical holism
that further highlights the inadequacy of
methodological studies of consciousness.
Viewing interpretation as translation
between theories and understanding as an
epistemological problem, the theoretical
holist is guided by the Heideggerian
concept of vorsicht - our conceptual
schemes. The practical holist, in contrast, is
sensitive to our vorhabe - the totality of
our cultural practices. She views
interpretation as explication; i.e., meaning
arises only in specific contexts and against
a background of shared practices that are
not theorizable because they are pervasive
and involve skills (6-7). This distinction
leads Dreyfus, after considering the role of
non-technological micro-practices of Being
in understanding, to argue that the human
sciences are incommensurably different
from the physical sciences:
[S]ocial science might, indeed,
establish itself, only ... by leaving out the
social skills which make the isolation of
features or attributes possible. But such
skills and the context of everyday practices
they presuppose are internal to the human
sciences, just as the laboratory skills of
scientists are internal to the history and
sociology of science, for if the human
sciences claim to study human activities,
then the human sciences, unlike the natural
sciences, must take account of those human
activities which make possible their own
disciplines. (17)
The theoretical holism developed by
Richard Rorty, a view that supports and is
most closely aligned with Dennett's
intentional stance, does not attend to this
distinction. 30 Furthermore, Kogler has
argued persuasively that Dreyfus' practical
holism itself puts one in an untenable
ethnocentric situation. 31 Addressing the
shortcomings of practical and theoretical
holism in dealing with power structures in
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dialogue (e.g. ethnocentricity and social
structures), Kogler has developed a broader
conception of henneneutic competence
(acknowledging the role of empathy in
understanding) that incorporates both
aspects of holism and strives to overcome
the deficiencies of these approaches in
understanding consciousness in his work
The Power of Dialogue and more recently
in his lecture "Language and the Paradigm
of Perfonnativity". All of these holistic
variants hinge on the examination language
and on a conception of dialogue as the
basis for inquiry and explication of the
human condition and consciousness.
Having considered the human sciences
in general, I will close with a discussion of
the positive implications for
heterophenomenology and other similar
efforts in cognitive science regarding the
limited and misguided nature of interpretive
methodological inquiry. Dennett's work, as
a case study for cognitive science and as a
bridge between the analytic and continental
strains of philosophical thought, has mainly
served as a vehicle to launch our
discussion. If research in cognitive science
is to continue while maintaining sensitivity
to the insights of post-modern visions of
language, how will it refonnulate its goals?
What is the future role of cognitive
science? In discussions with Professor
Kogler, I have considered possible
technological worst-case scenarios
involving artificial intelligence (AI). As in
the case of old science fiction, the future
usually seems better (or worse) than it
actually turns out to be. Artificial
intelligence will continue to be a
technological handmaiden to objectifying
inquiry - work in cognitive science and its
offspring will go on as long as the dialogue
of psychology continues. When I began this
study a year ago, I was strongly against the
idea of AI; my instinct was reactionary. In
the course of thinking and reading about
henneneutics and the philosophy of
language, I became deeply involved in an
internal dialogue, in effect internalizing a
dialogue within our Western tradition. I
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breached a broad area of knowledge
fonnerly unknown to me and basked in the
beauty of ideas finely interwoven and then
wove my own thread - this essay.
Through the exchange of ideas, I
discovered the true value of my Liberal
Studies work. Dialogue, in whatever fonn,
can not be denied; it leads to outward
growth, occasional retreat and refonnation,
and to the discovery of significance and
meaning in a lifeworld populated with so
many fresh other voices. The ethical
consequences of methodological inquiry in
the human sciences will be balanced by a
growing awareness of multiculturalism and
holistic discourses that mark the beginning
of our new century - marked with the
promise of a grand continuation of the
dialogue of humankind.
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